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Abstract 
 
American corporate governance faces two core instabilities. The first is the 
separation of ownership from control—distant and diffuse stockholders own, while 
concentrated management controls—a separation that creates not only great efficiencies 
but also big recurring breakdowns. In every decade since World War II, we’ve faced a 
fundamental large firm problem.  Each emanated from this fundamental instability. We 
will not stabilize, once-and-for-all, this instability because some form of separation is 
necessary for large firms, because it provides large efficiencies, and because once we 
resolve one derivative problem, another will in time arise. The Enron-type scandals are 
just the latest manifestation of the core fissure in the large American public firm.  
The second instability arises from our decentralized and porous regulatory system.  
Decentralization has key advantages—such as flexibility, specialization, and multiple 
informational channels—but with the advantages come costs in porosity. Our 
decentralized regulatory system leaves each regulator with weaknesses. Most importantly, 
they are not fully independent from the regulated. The regulated entities often deter the 
incompletely independent regulated from acting. The regulated can induce political 
authorities to deny the regulator enough power to act, they can get Congress to cut the 
regulator’s funding, they can fight the potential regulations in courts and Congress, and 
they can weaken the quality of the regulation that they face. The Enron-class scandals 
illustrate this regulatory instability of American corporate governance well. Thus one 
structural response to the first fissure—separation and managers without immediate 
bosses—would be to facilitate gatekeeping, via strong boards that check managers, via 
strong shareholders with the motivation to channel managers toward profitability, via 
powerfully independent, professionally-driven accountants who verify managers’ “report 
card,” and so on.  Some of these gatekeeping functions arise from contract, best practice, 
and the natural path of the market.  Many are facilitated by regulation, but here the 
regulated—often managers themselves—can affect the regulatory outcomes, often 
weakening it. Some regulation that does occur arises when public outrage is sufficiently 
high that the regulation is more brittle and less supple than would be ideal.  
Neither of these instabilities can be solved once-and-for-all, so that we can put it 
behind us.  Instead, we resolve the local and immediate problem, move on, and in time 
face a new problem emanating from one or both of these core instabilities. We muddle 
through; we don’t solve, because we can’t. 
  
                                                           
* Professor, Harvard Law School.  This paper will appear as a chapter in Restoring Trust in 
American Business, forthcoming from MIT Press in 2005. Thanks go to Jeffrey Gordon, Howell 
Jackson, Guhan Subramanian, and Andy Zelleke for comments on an earlier draft. Draft: September 2004 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent business crises seem new and different from what has gone on 
before. But at their core, they are not. The core fissure in American corporate 
governance is the separation of ownership from control—distant and diffuse 
stockholders, with concentrated management—a separation that creates both great 
efficiencies and recurring breakdowns.  True, some of the Enron-class scandals’ 
specific problems are new, or exaggerated forms of what’s come before—special 
purpose vehicles with complex funding arrangements, unusually high executive 
compensation with stock options a dominating component, failure at a venerable 
accounting firm, some inattentive boards of directors—but the specifics still derive 
from the core structure of American corporate governance.  We will solve the current 
issues—or, more plausibly, reduce them to manageable proportions—but then 
sometime later, somewhere else, another piece of the corporate apparatus will fail.  
We’ll have another corporate governance crisis and it will emanate from the same 
basic source: that ownership has separated from control in large firms.  We’ll patch it 
up, we’ll move on, we’ll muddle through.  That’s what will happen this time, and 
that’s what will happen next time. 
Separation is the foundational instability of American corporate governance.   
But it’s not the only key instability, and the current crises exemplify the other key one 
as well. We have a decentralized and porous regulatory system.  Yes, decentralization 
has key advantages: regulatory specialization, multiple channels of information 
flowing into the regulators, and the potential for multiple regulatory players to loosely 
check one another, without an overarching, potentially rigid regulatory monolith.  One 
regulator might miss the problem, but—we hope—another one catches it. 
But decentralization’s advantages come with two costs in porosity. And they’re 
big ones.  First off, a corporate crisis could arise in which no specialized regulator is 
immediately equipped to head off the problem; and each may think the task really 
belongs to another regulator, thought to be better equipped to handle the current 
problem. 
Moreover, and probably more importantly, our decentralized regulatory system 
leaves each regulator with weaknesses; each has incomplete authority. And the 
regulated can, and often do, exploit these weaknesses, sometimes deterring the 
regulator from acting well, either by influencing political authorities to deny the 
regulator authority, or by fighting the potential regulations in courts and Congress.  
This porosity deters much over-regulation, an important advantage here.  But it also 
can deter good regulation.  The Enron-class scandals illustrate well this instability of 
American corporate governance: gatekeepers like accountants kept their regulatory 
climate weak and fought back regulatory attempts to reduce their conflicts of interest. 
The presumably regulated firms influenced the accounting measures of profitability, 
most famously in whether stock options paid to executives and employees should be Instability of American Corporate Governance  2
expensed just like other employee pay.  And in reaction to the corporate governance 
crises, the Securities and Exchange Commission is now considering tilting boardroom 
authority a little less strongly toward managers—although by no more than a few 
degrees—but in trying to do so, they’ve faced a buzz-saw of managerial opposition, 
opposition that has thus far stopped the SEC from recalibrating shareholder-managerial 
authority. 
Combine these two instabilities and we can see a deeper structure to the Enron-
class breakdowns.  To mitigate the problems of separation, markets and regulators 
have built institutions whose primary task is to check and validate managers’ actions, 
since the separation of ownership from control raises the risk of managerial misdeeds.  
Some of that checking—“gatekeeping,” in corporate governance parlance—is itself 
regulated.  But with our porous system of regulation, the core regulated group—the 
managers—can induce regulators to weaken the direct oversight that they face, can 
influence Congress to deny the regulators enough funding to be effective, can deter 
good regulation, and can thereby render some gatekeepers ineffectual in checking 
managers. There’s more than a little of that combination—a one-two punch to the belly 
of American corporate governance—in the Enron group of scandals. 
 
I.  THE FUNDAMENTAL FISSURE 
 
A. The Concept 
 
By the end of the 19
th century, the engineering advances in a continent-wide 
economy made large-scale production efficient.  With the railroads running across the 
nation, production could be huge and local, but distribution could be national.
1  The 
capital needed for that kind of production outstripped the capacity of even the 
wealthiest. To pool capital—especially in the cases of mergers and founders selling off 
their holdings—equity moved from controlling shareholders into dispersed stock 
markets, and ownership separated from control.  The quintessential academic analysis 
came in Berle and Means’ famous book.
2 The nature of separation and its degree got 
an extra push from American populist politics, which kept American financial 
institutions—banks and insurers at the turn of the 20
th century—small, weak, and 
generally without authority to own stock.  Had the banks and insurers been large and 
capable of owning stock, they could have played a larger role inside the large firm, as 
they did in other nations and as their successors are increasingly playing now—as 
institutional investors—in the early 21
st century.
3
                                                           
1 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977). 
2 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(New York: Macmillan, 1933). 
3 Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate 
Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). And then we would have faced a different 
sort of separation, one that would have focused more on financial institutions—and hence on the 
separation between savers and the institution’s portfolio—and less on corporate ownership. 
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B. The Advantages 
 
The advantages of separation are clear and need little repeating.  Separation 
allows for a scale of operation far beyond any individual’s capacity to provide capital.  
Even Bill Gates, the richest American, owns only 10% of Microsoft.  Distant outsiders, 
and a few other insiders, own the rest.  Moreover, separation allows firms to combine 
managers with talent but without much capital (at least initially) with investors who 
have capital but neither the time nor the skills to manage.  It provides founders a key 
exit strategy; exit barriers are also entry barriers, and if founders didn’t have a range of 
exits, entrepreneurial activity would presumably be weaker than it is in the United 
States.  Separation also allows investors to diversify, facilitating more efficient savings 
over time. And it facilitates product market competition, by easing the financing needs 
of start-ups and new entrants. 
 
C. The Recurring Breakdowns 
 
But separation’s advantages come with costs.  The most significant cost that 
repeatedly destabilizes corporate governance is that with ownership separated from 
management, managers’ control of the firm can lead to poor results.  No one might 
check them.  Managers’ goals sometimes deteriorate into just wanting to be paid well, 
to live well, and to keep those operations going that they understand, instead of doing 
the hard work of innovating for the firm, its stockholders, and American consumers.  
Without anyone checking, the problems might fester.  More importantly, technologies 
and markets change, and sometimes the incumbent managers aren’t the right ones to 
handle the change.  But with ownership separated from control, they hang on for 
longer than is good for the economy. 
Concentrated shareholding reduces separation’s problems but comes with its 
own costs, mostly by enhancing the risk that insiders shift value from outside 
shareholders to themselves.  Other nations face this problem more than we do.  There’s 
no “silver bullet.” 
We can see a series of American corporate crises in the half-century or so since 
World War II, all emanating from the core difficulty of separation. Our Enron and 
WorldCom crises are just the latest manifestation of the underlying fissure, the 
inevitable cost that comes with the benefits of separation. In the 1950s, the crisis was 
in the corporation’s—and its managers’—overwhelming power in society, power that 
came when separation combined with domestic oligopoly that didn’t yet face strong 
international competitors. In the 1960s, it was the large corporations’ impulse to 
expand sales without regard to profits, innovation, or consumer well-being, often 
resulting in unwieldy conglomerates.  Hostile takeovers burst on the scene in the late 
1970s, and had become by the 1980s a cause célèbre of corporate, political, and social 
debate. In their best manifestation, they were the means to reduce the costs of 
separation, and make managers more responsive to markets.  In their worst 
interpretation, they were the means by which greedy managers expanded their 
corporate empires. And by the end of the 1980s the insider trading scandals—centering 
on Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and a few others—were seen in the press, and 
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perhaps by the public, as central to a tawdry corporate system.  In the late 1990s, 
executive compensation—exemplified by CEO Michael Eisner’s infamously large 
1999 paycheck from Disney—seemed out of control.  And then in the 21
st century’s 
first decade we’ve had Enron, WorldCom, and associated failures, in which managers 
misstated their numbers, and their accountant watchdogs’ eyes were closed.  Or worse. 
Each decade had its crisis, and each crisis had its quintessential academic 
analysts.  And each crisis, and the analytic movement it precipitated, can be traced 
back to the separation of ownership from control, occasionally via a reaction, or over-
reaction, to the prior crisis.  Let’s review each breakdown in more detail. 
1. Managerial power in the 1950s.  The issue in the 1950s was power.  Consider 
a primary academic document of that time, Edward Mason’s edited collection of 
essays, The Corporation in Modern Society.
4  (Mason was an economics professor at 
Harvard who had brought together a group of corporate thinkers to contemplate the 
1950s firm.)  The consensus view then was that the large corporation was a powerful 
creature that had to be tamed. Otherwise it would trample its employees, its customers, 
and its communities.  It was too powerful, and the polity had to watch it warily. Public 
policy should be, it was thought, directed to taming and caging the firm. 
Mason himself said:  “This powerful corporate machine, which so successfully 
grinds out the goods we want, seems to be running without any discernible controls.”
5   
Others said that the corporation had “produced a tension of power … [as] giant 
enterprises … come to rival the sovereignty of the state itself.”
6 Looking back, I’d say 
that oligopolistic slack in the product markets had combined with ownership separation 
to give managers at the large firms—GM, GE, IBM—enormous power and discretion.    
That power arose from the large American firms’ command over capital, from 
their size, and from their insulation from strong competition in American oligopolistic 
markets that lacked serious international competition. Separation gave them discretion, 
and separation gave them freedom to build over-sized firms. The Big Three 
automakers, Big Steel, and the electrical equipment manufacturers were powerful 
firms with powerful managers who enjoyed discretion over what to do with above-
normal profits.  Managerial discretion—from separation—and big profits made the 
power of American managers salient in 1950s. Would the powerful captains of 
industry distribute those supra-normal profits to themselves—via high salaries, nice 
offices, and a quiet life?  Or to shareholders, to employees, to charity, or to customers 
via a better product?  
That sense of overweening power faded.  Antitrust policy was the central 
remedy in academic analyses in the 1950s and early 1960s. Perhaps merger policy—
the Justice Department and court decisions barred most big horizontal and vertical 
mergers during the era—made a difference, and academic analysts of the time hoped it 
would.  But the rise of international competitors in manufacturing also affected 
                                                           
4 Edward Mason, ed., The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1959). More detail on this era can be found in Mark J. Roe, “From Antitrust to Corporate 
Governance? The Corporation and the Law: 1959–1994,” in Carl Kaysen, ed., The American 
Corporation Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 102–127. 
5 Mason, ed., The Corporation in Modern Society, 3–4. 
6 Id., 218. 
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American managerial power, perhaps more so. Heightened competition and rapidly 
changing technologies changed managers from the all-powerful players the academics 
found them to be in the 1950s, to misdirected builders of unwieldy conglomerates by 
the 1970s, and then to failures at reconstructing their firms in the 1980s.   
But at the core of the perceived problem of the 1950s was ownership separation.  
Separation and strong profits gave those firms’ managers discretion over an enormous 
pool of profits and capital that far exceeded the individual wealth of any of them.  
They could build and run big, over-sized firms.  They seemed powerful, and they were. 
2. Expanding, satisficing, and maximizing sales in the 1960s and 1970s.  By the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the perception changed from power to waste.  Firms spent 
too much on advertising, provided too many quickly-obsolete products, and expanded 
for size, not profits.  Managerialism was still front and center, but the dominant sense 
then—reflected in Oliver Williamson’s classics—was that managers maximized their 
power, prestige, and salaries by maximizing sales. As to profits, they merely satisficed. 
Managers couldn’t ignore profits entirely, but as long as they were in an acceptable 
range, it was sales that they sought to maximize.
7
3. The conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s.  Bloat and discretion had their 
quintessential corporate form: the American conglomerate of that era. A headquarters 
of strategic thinkers would direct the far-flung subsidiaries in the multi-divisional 
corporation.  Local managers would have local information and skills, while the 
central managers had vision and the capacity to allocate capital.  For a time the 
conglomerate was not seen as a problem, but as a solution to ownership separation, as 
the central managers at headquarters would monitor the operating managers in the 
divisions and subsidiaries, giving the stars more capital and squeezing money out of 
the weaker divisions.  This state of affairs—and the conglomerates’ capacity to reduce 
separation’s managerial problems—was briefly celebrated in economics circles.
8
4. Hostile takeovers and competitive failure in the 1970s and 1980s.  By the 
1980s, the large American manufacturing firm looked like it was on the ropes.   
Powerful European and Japanese competitors were out-producing their American 
rivals.  Oligopolistic profits were gone, as the big firms in industry after industry had 
to compete with tough players from overseas.  Something had to be done to squeeze 
out corporate bloat, to make the American firm lean, mean, and competitive once 
again, to dismantle the slow-moving conglomerates. Conglomerates were no longer the 
solution to the separation fissure, they were its biggest problem. 
The market and theory also gave us a mechanism to reduce separation’s then-
current critical problem—the conglomerate and the misdirected manager—via the 
hostile takeover.  The takeover entrepreneur would buy up the firm’s stock, sell off the 
divisions separately, and then make a profit because the pieces could be better 
                                                           
7 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in 
a Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964). See also Robin Marris, The 
Economic Theory of “Managerial” Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1964); Herbert A. Simon, 
“Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in C. B. McGuire and Roy Radner, eds., Decision and 
Organization (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1972); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Princeton: Prentice Hall, 1962). 
8 Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A 
Study in the Economics of Internal Organization (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
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managed separately than jointly in the slack-heavy conglomerate; so buyers would pay 
more for the better-managed separate divisions, enough to cover the costs of the 
takeover. This possibility was celebrated in financial analyses, most prominently by 
Michael Jensen.
9  Leveraged  buyouts would focus managers’ attention on a single 
firm with a single product, reducing separation’s problems. 
Counter-arguments arose. Firms needed to make commitments to their 
employees, and a deep hostile takeover market made managerial commitments 
worthless, because the managers could be thrown out.  In the public arena, a key issue 
was seen to be that takeovers broke implicit promises that managers made to 
employees, who thought they had an understanding that they would keep their jobs as 
long as they did their work well, not just for as long as markets—financial, product, 
and takeover—agreed.  And some takeovers were done not to dismantle the bloated 
conglomerate, but to build more power for the offering managers.  But wherever one 
stood on these issues, the source of the problem was clear: it was again the separation 
of ownership from control.   
5. Insider trading in the 1980s.  Separation meant those trading stock would 
often have less information than those inside the corporation.  Often that disparity of 
information wasn’t very important, because the insiders didn’t know much that would 
change the value of the stock.  Though cases of unlawful insider trading arose 
intermittently and others presumably went undetected, the problem seemed decidedly 
second-order. 
The explosion of takeovers changed that.  Players who got wind of a takeover at 
a big premium had information that they could trade on profitably.  They could buy 
stock from naïve, distant individual investors at low prices, and then make a bundle 
when the offer was announced.  Not only did inside managers have this information, 
but so did inside Wall Street professionals—and the Wall Streeters knew how to trade 
fast and well. The burst of inside trading led to headlines, indictments—most famously 
of Michael Milken, the junk bond trader, and Ivan Boesky, the arbitrageur—and 
demeaned the legitimacy of the stock market in the eyes of many.
10
6. Executive pay in the 1990s.  In 1999, Michael Eisner’s pay was more than 
$500 million, including profits from the stock options he cashed in.
11 Some thought 
that excessive, and his paycheck got headlines and media attention; others thought it a 
just reward for the shareholder value he initially created.
12  Executive pay rose then 
both in absolute and relative terms.  Executive pay was about 40 times the average 
                                                           
9 Michael C. Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” 
American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings 76 (1986): 323. 
10  Milken was not indicted for insider trading, but for securities violations arising from 
“parking” stock.   
11  See “Forbes Executive Pay,” available at  www.forbes.com/lists. 
12 See Elizabeth Smith, “This is Not Michael Eisner’s Pay Stub…,” Fortune (June 8, 1998): 
294; “Who Wants to Be a Billionaire?,” The Economist (May 8, 1999) (p. 14); “Who Earned the 
Pay—And Who Didn’t,” Business Week (April 19, 1999): 75.  Some commentators thought that 
Disney’s stock performance justified the pay; indeed, by tying compensation to performance, the high 
compensation may have caused the excellent financial results. The paycheck was still controversial. 
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worker’s pay from the 1950s to 1980.
13  After a sustained rise in executive pay during 
the 1990s, CEO compensation rose from 140 times to 500 times the average 
employee’s pay by 2003.
14    Explanations are several.  The pay could have been 
efficient, in better aligning senior managers with stockholders.
15  The pay rewarded 
modern executives for the excess risks that managers faced in a volatile 1990s, when 
executive turnover was rapid.  The CEO got paid well, but, like a star athlete, would 
only keep that job for a few years.
16
Or the pay resulted from ownership separation.  No one was checking managers 
closely; norms had changed; and executives could now cash in on their power inside 
the firm.
17   
7. And Enron in the 21
st century. And then came Enron.  Enron’s managers, 
most notably Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow, misstated their firm’s numbers, 
in ways that moved funds out from Enron and into their own pockets, and no one 
caught it.  Enron’s obligations via the related special purpose vehicle financings 
weren’t stated in Enron’s financials. The board’s audit committee didn’t catch the 
problem; the board suspended the firm’s own conflict-of-interest rules; and the firm’s 
accountants didn’t react to the problem. Separation meant that those watching 
internally—the board and its committees—weren’t watching their own money.  With 
specialization they depended on others for information—primarily lower-ranking 
managers inside the firm, like Fastow, but also outsiders—and those others didn’t 
provide it well.  While Enron’s fraud in using the related entities—the special purpose 
vehicles—was novel in its specifics, WorldCom’s financial misstatements were more 
ordinary—just big. 
*   *   * 
So when ownership separates from control, problems arise.  Managers pursue 
their own agenda, and it seems that in every decade there’s been a systematic failure. 
Combine separation with oligopoly and we got enormous power in the 1950s. 
Combine separation with ideas about conglomerates and we got mega-firms without 
continued justification in the 1960s. We got solutions—like hostile takeovers—against 
which the public reacted in the 1980s.  We got hyper-pay in the 1990s, which was 
partly a solution and partly a resultant problem. And in the beginning of the 21
st 
                                                           
13 “Face Value:  Business as the New Rock and Roll,” The Economist (November 28, 1998): 
70; John A. Byrne, “What, Me Overpaid? CEOs Fight Back,” Business Week (May 4, 1992): 142–
143. 
14 Janice Ravel, “Mo’ Money, Fewer Problems: Is it a Good Idea to Get Rid of the $1 Million 
CEO Pay Ceiling?” Fortune (March 31, 2003): 34. 
15 Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Are CEOs Really Paid like Bureaucrats?” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 63 (1998): 653; Kevin Murphy, “Executive Compensation,” in Orley 
Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics (Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1999). 
16 Rakesh Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic 
CEOs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
17 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,” 
Journal of Economics Perspectives 17 (2003): 71–92; Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Pay 
Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004, forthcoming); Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, “CEO Incentives—
It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How,” Harvard Business Review 68 (May-June 1990): 138–149. 
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century we got misstated financial statements that undermined confidence in stock 
markets, and made the mis-staters (temporarily) rich. 
We haven’t been able to fully stabilize the collateral damage from ownership 
separation.  Weaknesses appeared, became toxic, and then we had to cure and repair.  
But we would do better than we have thus far—or at least we would have a differing 
set of primary problems—were it not for the negative effects of the second major 
instability in American corporate governance: the porous nature of regulation.   
American regulation is open and decentralized, and those qualities give the 
regulated—often the very managers whom we are trying to direct toward efficiency 
and away from scurrilous behavior—the capacity to influence, and often weaken, that 
regulation. 
 
II. THE POROSITY OF AMERICAN REGULATION 
 
A. The Decentralized Structure 
 
1. Federalism.  The United States doesn’t have a centralized “czar” whose job it 
is to regulate corporate governance.  Often this decentralization is celebrated, 
especially when it’s in the form of state competition for corporate charters, and the 
concomitant regulation of the corporation via state corporate law.
18 That state-based 
regulation tends to come through contractual enabling—the corporate charter can be 
built in almost any way that the participants prefer—and judge-enforced fiduciary 
duties. Regulatory commissions and criminal actions are largely absent in making state 
corporate law.
19
That said, corporate governance is also federal, via the securities laws and the 
SEC.  True, the SEC’s power here is incomplete, mostly centered on disclosure and 
trading in the securities markets.  But corporate governance can be deeply affected by 
simple disclosure. That is, most states have some rule or another against thievery and 
interested party transactions.  The transactional problem is how to get that information 
out from inside the corporation.  Mandatory disclosure rules, mandatory accounting 
rules, and SEC control (or influence) over the accounting profession can—when the 
SEC acts properly and is adequately funded—deeply affect corporate governance.
20
                                                           
18 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington, D.C.: AEI 
Press, 1993). Not everyone is happy with this decentralization, with many analysts thinking it leads to 
rules that overly favor managers. William L. Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware,” Yale Law Journal 83 (1974): 663, 705; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,” Harvard Law Review 
105 (1992): 1437, 1509. 
19 Cf. Mark J. Roe, “Delaware’s Advantage” (working paper, 2004). 
20 Mark J. Roe, “Delaware’s Competition,” Harvard Law Review 117 (2003): 588–646. Cf. 
William W. Bratton, “Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular,” University of Toronto Law 
Journal  44 (1994): 401, 419; John C. Coffee, Jr., “The Future of Corporate Federalism: State 
Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards,” Cardozo Law 
Review 8 (1987): 759, 768; Melvin Eisenberg, “The Structure of Corporation Law,” Columbia Law 
Review 89 (1989): 1461, 1512; Arthur Fleischer, Jr., “Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment,” 
Harvard Law Review 78 (1965): 1146 (federal disclosure rules control fiduciary behavior); Mark J. 
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2. Further fragmentation.  And then there’s Congress.  It acts sporadically in 
corporate governance, but it does act.  And courts sometimes interpret key provisions 
of the securities or other federal laws to make corporate policy.  Moreover, some 
elements of corporate governance are self-regulatory:  The New York Stock Exchange 
makes governance rules, though often after SEC prodding.  And private codes of 
conduct arise from time to time. 
This fragmented nature sometimes allows one regulator to check the other; if 
one state doesn’t act, then maybe the New York Attorney General will swing into 
action.  If states are in managers’ palms, then maybe an SEC with overall American 
economic performance in mind will use its bully pulpit to induce action, or might act 
directly itself.  
But the fragmented nature of regulation also allows some potential innovation 
and cross-checking to fall unused through the cracks.  Stock exchange officials might 
consider forensic audits to be a good idea, but the stock exchanges could think it’s 
someone else’s job to push for it.  Delaware’s judges bemoan the fact that they can’t 
do the fact-finding and prospective regulation that a regulatory agency could 
undertake.
21  That is, one of our most important corporate governance regulators can 
only act after the fact, when private parties bring it a case to decide.  The SEC could 
bemoan its lack of full power over the public corporation; it might have lots of good 
ideas, but the securities laws give it only incomplete authority, and the Business 
Roundtable (and the business lobby more generally) stands ready to remind the SEC 
(and, if necessary, the federal courts) of the limits to the SEC’s power.   
 
B.  The Inevitably Porous Structure 
 
1. The conceptual issues.  Fragmentation obviously has its advantages and its 
disadvantages.  One can’t say in the abstract which is better, fragmentation or 
centralization.  On the plus side, we don’t suffer from an unchecked, monolithic 
regulator.  And we usually don’t suffer from too much over-regulation.  Differing 
regulators have differing sources of information, differing regulatory styles, and 
differing modes of enforcement.  The regulated can interact with the regulators to 
bring to bear the information they have to make the resulting regulation better than it 
would otherwise be and to avoid a regulator’s tendency to over-regulate.  It’s easy for 
a regulator to be too tough on boards of directors.  The regulator gets credit for solving 
the problem, but then the boards become less attractive for directors to join, or less 
effective in running the nation’s business.  Pushback from the regulated reduces over-
regulation. 
But decentralization, even if good on balance, is not good in all respects.  Some 
items may fall through the cracks, and that might be the price we pay for the 
advantages of decentralization.  But the regulated have a deep impact on the 
fragmented regulators and that raises the costs even higher. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Roe, “Takeover Politics,” in Margaret Blair, ed., The Deal Decade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1993), 321, 340–347. 
21  One wonders why they don’t ask the Delaware legislature to set up a corporate law 
regulatory agency. 
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(a) In Delaware.  Everyone agrees that managers strongly influence the making 
of Delaware’s corporate law.  While the judiciary is independent, the legislature can, 
and sometimes does, overturn the courts.  And the Delaware legislature acts after a bar 
association committee—drawn from leaders of the law firms that represent managers 
and sometimes investors—recommends action. The agreement on managerial 
influence is wide; the difference in opinion is on whether that influence is pernicious 
or, overall, beneficial.
22  Perhaps managerial influence explains why, for better or 
worse, Delaware is not seen as a tough regulator, why it doesn’t use criminal penalties 
for corporate governance misdeeds, and why it has no forward-looking powerful 
regulator. 
More generally, consider how the states, and Delaware in particular, responded 
to takeovers in the 1980s.  Conceptually takeovers can be seen as a key way to reduce 
the costs of ownership separation; mediocre managers would find their stock price 
dropping.  Outsiders would buy up the stock, fire the managers, reconstruct the firm to 
be profitable, and thereby make the takeover pay for them.  But target firm managers 
disliked takeovers.  So they lobbied state legislatures to bar them, often successfully.  
Takeovers were one way to reduce the costs of separation, but the regulated affected 
how easily takeovers could occur.  Most states passed laws that made hostile takeovers 
much harder, and managers’ lobbying was central to getting those laws enacted.
23  
And while Delaware was slow to enact an anti-takeover law, it did come around, and 
managerial influence was quite visible. 
(b) In Congress. Congress can regulate corporate governance.  But its members 
run for election, and they need campaign contributions.   
Takeovers again provide an example.  In the 1980s, hostile takeovers were 
central to American corporate governance.  In the late 1980s, Congress considered 
legislation that would have barred many of managers’ defensive measures.  Lobbying 
by the Business Roundtable—big firms’ lobbying organization—probably affected the 
outcomes of what passed, or more accurately, didn’t pass. 
Moreover, Congress can control other regulators, like the SEC.  Managers who 
face a loss with the SEC can lobby Congress to rein the SEC in. 
(c) Via information and lobbying. The regulated can bring forward and highlight 
the negative aspects of any proposed regulation of themselves, or any looming 
empowerment of their gatekeeper-watchers.  In the balance, the proposed regulation 
could then seem less wise than it otherwise would look.   
                                                           
22 And, actually, some are less certain of how independent the judiciary always is. Judges are 
picked after vetting by bar associations and law firms, after their corporate loyalty is tested. See 
William L. Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,” Yale Law Journal 
83 (1974): 663; Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law,” Texas Law Review 65 (1987): 469, 473. 
23 Roe, Strong Managers, 151–168; Roe, “Takeover Politics,” in Margaret Blair, 340–347; 
Joseph A. Grundfest, “Subordination of American Capital,” Journal of Financial Economics 27 
(1990): 89–114; Roberta Romano, “The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes,” Virginia Law 
Review 73 (1987): 11.  Some state legislators surely thought takeovers were bad policy. And others 
responded to target firm employees’ interests, not just managerial interests. But no one would deny 
that managers were important lobbyists for state anti-takeover laws. 
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In 1991, the SEC proposed loosening up the then-severe restrictions on 
institutional investor action, some of which continue today. At that time, if institutional 
investors talked widely enough about dysfunctional boards and how some board 
members should be turned out, they risked criminal prosecution for failing to file a 
proxy statement.  (While the risk of real criminal prosecution was low, the real risk of 
some SEC enforcement action and its concomitant embarrassment was enough to deter 
activity.)  The securities laws required a proxy filing when shareholders communicated 
with the intention, or as part of a plan, to change control of a corporation.  When the 
SEC first brought forward its plan to loosen up the rigid rules here, managers spoke of 
smoke-filled back-room deals among institutional investors to the detriment of small 
stockholders.
24  The SEC withdrew its proposed rule and, for a time, it seemed dead.  
Then the SEC came back with a weaker but still viable version, and promulgated that 
rule.
25   
Another instance is the American Law Institute’s effort to promulgate standards 
for corporate governance that would tighten up the structure of the American 
corporation at its top.  The Institute is run neither solely by ivory tower professors nor 
by regulators fully separated from the regulated.  Business lawyers—managers’ 
representatives, corporate counsel, and so on—are big players, and they defeated 
several proposals to tighten up corporate governance.  Reformers trying to draft the 
ALI Corporate Governance rules “were opposed by a cohesive group of corporate 
counsel and the companies who employed them. The ALI ultimately adopted a vague 
rule that permitted directors and state courts to do what they had previously been 
doing.”
26  We have a looser system—for good or ill—partly because it’s the managers’ 
representatives who drafted, or had to approve, many of the rules and quasi-rules. 
(d) Via litigation.  The regulated can attack regulation that would better align 
managers and insiders with stockholders.  One well-known example is the SEC’s effort 
to reduce insider power by barring recapitalizations that led to insiders having more 
votes per share of stock than outsiders.  Such recapitalizations were at the time a 
common method for target firm stockholders to resist hostile takeover offers; they kept 
enough votes for themselves to stop takeovers that other shareholders might have 
wanted. The Business Roundtable opposed the rule.  When the SEC promulgated it 
                                                           
24 “Business Roundtable Criticizes SEC Plan on Shareholder Data,” Wall Street Journal, 
September 20, 1991, A4. 
25 Stephen Labaton, “U.S. Pressed by Business Over S.E.C,” New York Times, October 18, 
1991, D1: The Business Roundtable met with the administration to bypass the SEC “in trying to 
prevent new rules for corporate shareholder battles.” The Roundtable also attacked the SEC’s 
proposed rules as allowing back-room corporate deals. See also Roberta S. Karmel, “CalPERS versus 
the Business Roundtable,” New York Law Journal (February 21, 1991): 3.  
26  Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, “The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 143 (1995): 595–642. Similarly, Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
“Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project,” George Washington Law 
Review 61 (1993): 1034, 1044, 1048, 1052.  Bainbridge reports that it was alleged “that corporations 
were hiring members of the ALI to represent their interests in that body’s deliberations and that they 
were removing their legal business from law firms with partners who were sympathetic to the ALI’s 
pro-litigation outlook.” See also Jonathan R. Macey, “The Transformation of the American Law 
Institute,” George Washington Law Review 61 (1993): 1212, 1228–1232. 
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anyway, the Roundtable attacked the SEC’s rule as exceeding the SEC’s authority 
under the securities laws.  They won.
27
2. The recent examples. Both the run-up to the Enron scandals and the 
regulatory reaction display America’s porosity in regulating corporate governance.   
Some of it is on the positive side:  Congress reacted proactively via the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, and Delaware has gotten tougher on insiders since the scandals 
broke.  The New York Attorney General swung into action, and the SEC has begun to 
consider rules that would further regulate managers and accountants. Multiple 
regulations offered multiple solutions, emanating from their specialized strengths. 
But not all porosity was good.  Accountants as lobbyists with Congress had held 
off the SEC from reducing accountants’ conflicts of interests.  The regulated in 
general—managers as well as accountants—watched as an anti-regulatory Congress 
starved the SEC of funding.
28  Managers at first slowed Sarbanes-Oxley reforms in 
Congress.  One reformer—John Biggs—was blocked from taking over the regulation 
of the accounting gatekeepers.  And managers and their regulatory allies have thus far 
stopped the SEC from tightening up corporate governance in a way that would 
heighten shareholder oversight. 
Let’s look at these in more detail. 
(a) Accountants and Congress.  Accountants were auditing their clients and 
selling them consulting services, often of tax strategy or in information systems.   
Managers could influence their gatekeepers by turning the consulting revenue spigots 
open, or by closing them.
29  Arthur Levitt, the chair of the SEC, wanted to break this 
conflict. In June 2000, the SEC proposed rules to separate auditing from consulting.   
But the accountants lobbied Congress to stop Levitt. They succeeded.
30  Levitt’s 
abortive effort here is instructive.  Congress, in effect, told Levitt not to go forward, 
threatening both to cut SEC funding further and to reduce SEC authority. The SEC 
cannot resist a determined Congress.  And this time at least, the gatekeepers got to 
Congress. Levitt watered down the new rules, and didn’t separate auditing from 
consulting.
31  
(b) Silicon Valley’s stock options.  Silicon Valley liked to pay employees in 
stock options.  If the firm’s stock soared, the employees got rich.  But the firms didn’t 
like to deduct the value of the stock option as a cost of operating their firm.  The 
                                                           
27 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Roundtable at least 
won the battle. The SEC eventually induced the stock exchanges to promulgate one-share, one-vote 
rules. 
28 David E. Rovella, “Congressional Ploys Squeeze SEC Budget; A fight over the agency’s 
budget creates fiscal crisis,” National Law Journal, September 5, 1994. Congress cut the SEC’s 
funding request from $305 million to $125 million. And Congress also nixed the SEC’s plea to fund 
itself with further user fees: “Sen. Phil Gramm, R-Texas, who led the Republican effort to scuttle 
self-funding, said SEC independence ‘would only increase the likelihood of escalating fees on the 
securities markets’ and make the agency less responsive to Congress.” 
29 Jeffrey N. Gordon, “What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections,” University of Chicago Law Review 69 (1992): 
1233–1250.  
30 For a critical reportorial account, see Mike Brewster, Unaccountable: How the Accounting 
Profession Forfeited a Public Trust (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003). 
31 Brewster, Unaccountable: How the Accounting Profession Forfeited a Public Trust.   
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accountants’ regulatory organization, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(usually known as FASB) decided that employee pay in cash and employee pay in 
stock options were each still pay that was an expense to the corporation.  Expenses had 
to be deducted from income.  They moved toward requiring the value of employee 
stock options to be deducted from a firm’s accounting profits. 
But FASB never required American firms to deduct the value of options given 
to employees.  Why?  The regulated—here, Silicon Valley, the prime users of stock 
options—got to the regulators, this time through Congress: 
 
Following an intense lobbying campaign by Silicon Valley companies, several 
leading members of Congress, including Joseph Lieberman and Diane Feinstein, 
threatened to put the F.A.S.B. out of business if it went ahead with the change.  
The board backed down, [and thus that] … official attempt to control corporate 
avarice came to an end.
32
 
As Donald Langevoort points out in this volume, this ability of the regulated to 
influence the regulators further rationalized some managerial financial misreporting.
33 
Since the government backed down, why should executives try harder to report 
financial results precisely?   
And despite the post-scandal backlash, it’s not yet over:  The Silicon Valley 
lobbyists are still at it, in 2004: 
 
Silicon Valley was [in July 2004] sitting on … members of Congress, whispering 
sweet nothings in their ears. As in, stock options cost nothing.  And 312 members 
of the House listened. 
That was the number of congressmen who voted for the Baker Bill, a measure 
that damages efforts of the Financial Accounting Standards Board to enact rules 
mandating the expensing of stock options.  The bill violates FASB’s 
independence…. 
Not able to fight stock-option expensing completely, Silicon Valley was content 
with a compromise.  Knowing that something is wrong with not expensing any 
stock options, the writers of the Baker Bill want stock options for only the CEO 
and the next four highest-paid executives to be expensed.
34
 
(c) Cutting funding for the SEC; slowing reform after Enron.  In the 1990s, 
Congress sharply cut funding for the SEC.  Much of Congress’s early 1990s funding 
cutbacks arose out of the anti-regulatory thinking then dominating Congress.  One 
aspect is telling:  Some in Congress wanted to give the SEC authority to levy higher 
user fees, which the SEC could then use for its own operating budget. But, said 
Senator Phil Gramm and his allies, if the SEC could self-finance via user fees it would 
                                                           
32 John Cassidy, “The Greed Cycle: How the financial system encouraged corporations to go 
crazy,” The New Yorker, September 23, 2002, 64, 69. And FASB is a self-regulatory operation, not 
an independent imposing regulator. William W. Bratton, “Rules, Principles, and the Accounting 
Crisis in the United States,” European Business Organization Law Review 5 (2004): 7–25. 
33 At p. __. 
34 Jess Eisinger, “Microsoft Can Count. Intel Can’t,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2004.  
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become more independent from Congress.
35 Gramm won. So the chain persisted:   
interest groups—like our gatekeepers—can influence Congress, and Congress can 
control the SEC.   
After Enron broke, there was a flurry of reform thinking, but it faded quickly 
from the congressional agenda, apparently with managerial blessing and lobbying,
36 
and didn’t seem likely to produce action until WorldCom collapsed. With WorldCom’s 
collapse, members of Congress who had opposed strong regulatory reform changed 
their minds. 
(d) Today: Lobbying the SEC on shareholder access.  In the wake of Enron, the 
SEC concluded that America’s boards—the primary gatekeeper of internal managers—
would be stronger if stockholders of poorly performing companies could get access to 
the company’s proxy statement to elect a couple of directors.  Nothing dramatic, but a 
tilt toward opening up the boardroom.  (The usual American practice is that incumbent 
managers get their nomination and reelection expenses paid for by the company itself; 
others nominating directors have to pay their own expenses, which typically amount to 
millions of dollars.) British shareholders may remove directors, nearly at will. The 
SEC proposal would stop far short of that. 
But thus far managers have stymied the SEC, pressuring it to back off “in the 
face of opposition from the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, an 
organization of chief executives from the nation’s largest companies.”
37  The SEC’s 
retreat was seen as a “major victory for corporate executives who have fought to kill 
the rule.”
38 Managers had beaten back shareholder access proposals over the 
decades,
39 and thus far seem to have done so again, pushing the SEC back to a 
weakened version of its original plan.
40  The regulated beat back reform that would 
have narrowed that gap in the separation of ownership from control, our fundamental 
fissure.  They used information (arguing that the rule wouldn’t work well, would 
disrupt boardrooms, and would be used primarily by special interests) and worst-case 
scenarios (paralyzed boards or boards dominated by special interests without a 
shareholder agenda or, worse, with an anti-shareholder agenda
41), and tapped the 
Congress and the White House as levers.
42  
                                                           
35 “S.E.C. Budget Request Cut,” New York Times, June 28, 1994; Rovella, “Congressional 
Ploys Squeeze SEC Budget; A fight over the agency’s budget creates fiscal crisis”. 
36 William Neikirk, “Andersen: The Fallout,” Chicago Tribune, June 18, 2002 (corporate 
lobbying to stall reform). 
37 Stephen Labaton, “S.E.C. at Odds on Plan to Let Big Investors Pick Directors,” New York 
Times, July 1, 2004. See also Adrian Michaels, “Vote on Reforming Boardroom Elections Delayed 
by SEC Split,” Financial Times, June 1, 2004; Deborah Solomon, “SEC May Temper Plan to Boost 
Shareholders’ Powers,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004. 
38 Labaton, “S.E.C. at Odds on Plan to Let Big Investors Pick Directors.”  
39 Mortimer M. Caplin, “Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyers’ 
Role,” Virginia Law Review 37 (1951): 653, 682–684.  
40 Deborah Solomon, “SEC Nears Compromise on Shareholder Plan,” Wall Street Journal, 
August 11, 2004. 
41 Presumably they are referring to funds described in Damon Silvers’ essay in this volume, at 
p. __.  When the SEC in 1992 cut back rules that had made it a potentially criminal offense for 
investors to talk with one another about a bad board, some managerial groups were similarly unhappy 
with the potential of more gatekeeper oversight.  “Big-business leaders blasted the proxy change, 
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CONCLUSION  
 
American corporate governance has two inevitable instabilities.  With control 
separated from ownership, managers’ agenda differs from that of others inside the 
corporation; and, especially with ownership fragmented, a few managers sometimes go 
bad, demeaning their corporations and, if the misconduct is widespread enough, even 
the economy.  Technology changes, crises arise, and the problems in one decade differ 
from those of another decade.  But the principal problems arise from ownership 
separation, and ownership separation is with us to stay.   
Other nations have less ownership separation but that comes with another set of 
problems, mostly those that arise from concentrated ownership (via insider 
machinations) and weak stock markets (because one key financing source is less 
viable).  To say that our problems derive from separation isn’t to say that we can do 
better by giving up separation.  It just says that we have to deal repeatedly with 
separation’s derivative problems. 
Thus we fix up each current problem, and we muddle through.
43  We’ll further 
professionalize directors, as called for in the essay in this volume by Martin Lipton and 
Jay W. Lorsch.
44 But comprehensive, once-and-for-all “solutions” to the enduring 
challenges of American corporate governance are implausible.  So we go for ad hoc 
and partial solutions, like more professionalization and some of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
regulation, and then we move on. 
The essays that follow properly look at the breakdowns in gatekeepers that led 
to Enron and the associated scandals, and the Recommendations for Practice suggest 
how we can improve gatekeeper performance.
45 The gatekeepers are there because 
                                                                                                                                                   
contending that it will allow well-heeled shareholders to plot against the interests of companies and 
smaller holders without notification. It is ‘hard to fathom why the commission would allow big, 
powerful investors the right to line up votes for a proxy contest . . . without some kind of public 
disclosure to the other shareholders,’ said . . . an official of the Business Roundtable[.]” Kevin 
Salwen, “SEC Votes to Ease Barriers to Holders’ Communications,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 
1992.  
42 Adrian Michaels, “Board Election Rules Debate Defies Unanimity,” Financial Times, June 
16, 2004: “The SEC has entered . . . mainstream politics. The issue of proxy access involves pressure 
from the White House. The Business Roundtable is crucial to [the Bush administration’s] fund-
raising.” The quotation was of John Coffee, professor of law at Columbia Law School. Cf. Adrian 
Michaels, “Vote on reforming boardroom elections delayed by SEC split,” Financial Times, June 1, 
2004 (the shareholder access proposals “have pitted powerful business lobbyists against activist 
institutional investors”).  “Opponents of the proposals, such as the Business Roundtable, the powerful 
chief executive grouping, and the US Chamber of Commerce, say the plans would cause significant 
disruption even at well-run companies.” Id. 
43 Cf. Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration 
Review 19 (1959): 79–88. 
44 At p. __ and p. __, respectively. See also Margaret Blair’s essay on p. __. John S. Reed’s 
essay also calls for professionalization, although not with that vocabulary. Richard W. Painter, at p. 
__, is skeptical as to whether self-regulatory “clubs”—he focuses primarily on lawyers—can be 
effective without good regulation. Those ideas might extend to wondering whether 
professionalization of directors, alone, without good supporting regulation will work effectively. 
45 Consider also the essays by William R. Kinney, at p. __, and John H. Biggs, at p. __ (both 
on accountants); William T. Allen and Geoffrey Miller, at p. __ (on lawyers); and Felix G. Rohatyn, 
at p. __, and Gerald Rosenfeld, at p. __ (both on investment bankers). 
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managers and boards need to be checked.  It’s the board and managerial breakdown in 
the Enron, WorldCom, and the other big scandals that was primary. The gatekeepers 
were backstops. 
And the first instability interacts with the second one.  American corporate 
governance is porous. We have multiple regulators, each with strengths and 
weaknesses.  Moreover, the regulated often affect how they’re regulated.  Some of the 
breakdowns in the gatekeepers, and in the efforts to shore them up, emanated from the 
actions of the core group to be controlled—often American managers themselves, 
sometimes accountants, sometimes promoters of Silicon Valley start-ups. The 
regulated often sought to weaken the regulation that would have reduced their—the 
managers’—discretion.  Shareholders—diffuse and distant—have thus far been less 
well organized both in affecting firms and in affecting regulators and regulations, 
although that may change.  Some of this weakness in regulation and the regulators may 
well be good. It reduces rigidity. It facilitates change and entrepreneurial innovation. It 
gives us multiple informational channels into the regulators, so that the rules that 
emerge are more likely to be useful.   
But not all porosity is good.  Some of it has stopped government players from 
correcting breakdowns that derive from the separation of ownership from control, 
because the regulated often seek to deter not just bad regulation, but any regulation.  
Some of the gatekeeper breakdowns that the essays in this volume analyze might have 
been prevented had gatekeepers and managers not influenced regulators in ways that 
diminished the gatekeepers’ effectiveness.  The point here is not that centralization 
beats decentralization; centralization has its costs, and the regulatory difficulties in 
other countries display them.  The point is that decentralization is our problem, not that 
there’s a fundamental, once-and-for-all solution to the problem. 
When Congress acts, in some odd ways it has reason to overreact in the very 
way that the regulated often fear: when it can act, because the issue is salient, public 
servants may think that porosity will allow the regulated in the future to beat back 
some of the rules.  So public servants may actually seek more rigidity than is ideal, to 
reduce future erosion.  Put the package together—the regulated as able to affect the 
regulators and weaken their output, and regulators who when able to act think they 
must lock it all in—and we’ve made for more brittleness in corporate governance 
regulation than would be ideal. 
This won’t be the last time that corporate governance breaks and cracks in a key 
way.  Different stress points will develop in the public firm, and one or another of the 
persisting fissures will threaten to open, crack, and need to be fixed.  If we’re lucky, 
someone will anticipate the problem and fix it up beforehand.  If not, we’ll muddle 
through once again. It’s worked so far. 
 
 